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West Germany: An attempt by Foreign Minister Brandt to speed Bonn's decision on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty apparently has failed.

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[redacted]
[redacted] Finance Minister Strauss and other critics of the treaty have persuaded Chancellor Kiesinger to stick to the previously announced schedule and to make no decision on the treaty until the Bundestag reconvenes in late September.

Brandt, [redacted] had hoped that the cabinet meeting scheduled for 25 August would authorize him to announce to the Nonnuclear Conference in Geneva later this month that Bonn would sign the treaty. Brandt argued that his remarks to the conference on West German attitudes toward East-West relations, renunciation of force agreements, and European disarmament would have a serious impact if he could announce West Germany's approval of the treaty.

[redacted]
[redacted] treaty opponents would not be able to postpone a final and positive decision beyond September. The Soviets, too, are probably not as pessimistic as their public statements might suggest. Moscow can be expected to fulminate in its propaganda, however, about Bonn's delay in signing the treaty. [redacted]
[redacted]

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Uruguay: Communist leaders have decided publicly to endorse the party's participation in violent demonstrations.

In the past the leadership has tried not to be overtly identified with violence so as to avoid antagonizing the government and jeopardizing the party's legal status. This conservatism has alienated many youthful militants, however, and the new line is probably an attempt to stop further defections to more "revolutionary" organizations.

Many party members are participating in the student protests against government raids on the national university. More demonstrations may take place as a result of the new tactics, and the party is already planning to mount a major demonstration if a student injured over the weekend dies. Party leaders are trying to capitalize on student discontent, but hope to control the young hotheads and prevent violence from getting out of hand.

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